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LEGISLATIVE REFORM

THE CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
STATUTE AND JURY VERDICTS: DIFFERING
CONCEPTIONS OF "JURY UNANIMITY"
I. THE PROBLEM
A. Introduction
Congress enacted the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute ("CCE")' as part of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970 ("the Act").2 The
Act's purpose as a whole was to forcefully attack the illegal drug trafficking problem,
which, in the drafters' opinions, had reached epidemic proportions. The CCE was
directed specifically at drug "kingpins"--i.e., those who hold positions of authority or
management in drug operations-and the penalties for its violation are harsh. The
mandatory minimum sentence is twenty years' imprisonment; under certain conditions,
violating the CCE can lead to life in prison or even the death penalty.3
Due partially to these draconian penalties, the CCE embodies various elements
meant to assure that only "kingpins" are convicted thereunder. Some of these elements,
however, have proved troublesome to courts as they relate to jury concurrence, for a
jury might find that one is guilty of a CCE violation without agreeing on why.
To demonstrate preliminarily the difficulties posed by jury concurrence issues,
consider the following example:
Consider a case where D-1 is sued for injuring P-I in a car accident allegedly
caused by D-l's negligence. Some evidence shows that D-1 was speeding, other
evidence that he was drunk; proof of either alone would establish negligence. Six
jurors find that D-1 was speeding, but not drunk; the other six find that he was
drunk, but not speeding. All twelve agree that D-1 was "negligent," but there is no
unanimous agreement on what D-1 did that constituted negligence. May the jury
return a verdict for P-i'?
This article examines one of those elements - specifically, whether the jurors must
agree on the predicate acts which satisfy the "continuing series" provision of the statute. This provision requires that a defendant have committed a certain number of drug
violations before he can be convicted of a CCE offense. Two circuits have dealt extensively with this question, and have reached contrary conclusions.5 The Third Circuit

1. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)).

3.
4.
Whether
5.

21 U.S.C. §§ 848(a), (b), (e) (1988).
Hayden J. Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory:
Verdicts are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473 (1983).
21 U.S.C. § 848(c), the relevant portion of the statute for purposes of this article, reads as
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has determined that the jury must agree with exact specificity as to which predicate
acts the defendant committed for a conviction to result. The Seventh Circuit, however,
has argued that the CCE mandates no more than a unanimous finding that the defendant committed a "continuing series" of offenses.
The remainder of Part I will analyze the problems caused by the circuit split.
Part II of this article details the arguments on each side. Part III will argue the superiority of the Third Circuit's view and will suggest a manner in which the legislature's
intent could be clarified.
B. The Persistence and Perniciousness of the Split
The Supreme Court recently addressed the problem of jury unanimity in the context of a state murder statute in Schad v. Arizona.' However, no majority opinion resulted, and many questions were left unanswered. "All of the Justices indicated that
factual disagreement among jurors would violate the Constitution in some instances,
but none of them provided clear answers regarding when and why such situations
would arise to require that trial courts demand specific juror agreement on certain
factual elements. 7 The lower courts' difficulties in parsing out the CCE are due in
large part to the open-endedness of the Schad holding. Some problems also probably
result from the fact that CCE cases are distinguishable in many respects from the
Schad scenario. In any case, Schad is the closest the Supreme Court has come to

follows:
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons
with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory
position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
Another provision of this statute which has given rise to disagreement among the circuits is the language in subsection (2)(a), requiring a defendant to have acted in concert with five or more persons.
Most circuits have accepted the view that the jury need not agree on the identity of these five persons, but must merely agree that there were five persons acting in concert with the defendant.
Incidentally, the circuits are also split on the question of how many violations constitute a "continuing series." Most germane for purposes of this paper are the views of the Third Circuit (three or
more acts) (see, e.g., United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642 (3d Cir. 1988)) and of the Seventh Circuit (two or more acts) (see, e.g., United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 1940 (1992)).
6. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
7. Katherine L. Harvey, "Criminal Law-United States v. Canino and the Continuing- Criminal
Enterprise: Do Drug Kingpins Have a Right to Specific Juror Agreement?", 15 W. NEw ENG. L. REV.
271, 299 (1993).
8. Harvey, supra note 7, has highlighted one such distinction. "The Schad Court determined that
the alternative ways of committing first degree murder under the Arizona statute were not elements of
that offense, however, in a CCE case, the 'continuing series' provision constitutes an independent element of the CCE . . . . The mens rea alternative ways of committing first degree murder under the
Arizona statute must be distinguished from the predicate crimes required for a conviction of a CCE offense, as the latter represent distinct criminal acts which form the basis for CCE conviction." Id. at
302-03. The distinction between different ways of committing a crime and different crimes finds its
relevance in that many courts have focused on this point as the "dividing line" between legitimate and
baseless nonconcurrence claims. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Scott W. Howe, Jury
Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Limits on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting

1994]

Jury Unanimity

resolving the issue of jury unanimity on predicate acts under the CCE, and it has done
little in the way of clarification."
The effect of the circuits' disagreement is drastically different treatment of similarly-situated defendants in different circuits. And while such disparate treatment,
based on a happenstance characteristic like geographic location, is always a cause for
concern, its implications are especially serious here, for two related reasons.
For one, CCE cases involve significant constitutional questions. Whether we
prefer to describe it in terms of the Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth," ° no one disputes that a constitutional right is at stake. Illustrative is the following excerpt from the
Seventh Circuit's seminal Canino decision: "The constitutional requirement of juror
unanimity in federal criminal offenses is satisfied when each juror in a CCE trial is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant charged under the CCE statute
committed two predicate offenses.""
Secondly, as previously mentioned, the penalties for conviction under the CCE
are extremely harsh. When rights of such magnitude as to implicate the Constitution
are combined with sentences as harsh as death or life in prison, the least a defendant
should be able to expect is that his trial's outcome will not depend on the circuit in
which he is tried. And we must not forget that the Constitution has also been held to
require proof of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 It has been cogently argued and this article accepts the argument - that those courts which allow convictions based
on only general unanimity leave a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused actually
engaged in activity prohibited by the statute. This obviously contravenes our constitutional guarantees, and one's constitutional rights should be given great protection when
his life is at stake.
Even if the Seventh Circuit view were the correct one, however, a defendant's
treatment in court should not depend on where he is tried. Therefore, either way, the
legislature should clarify its intent so as to assure equal protection of all CCE defendants, for yet another of our constitutional guarantees is "equal protection under the
laws."

II. THE ARGUMENTS
A. United States v. Echeverri: The Third Circuit's Approach
In Echeverri," the defendant had been convicted at trial on five counts, one of
which was for operation of a continuing criminal enterprise. The defendant claimed on

Jurors, 58 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1993).
9. Professor Howe, among other commentators, has sharply criticized Schad. In Howe's view,
"none of the three opinions written revealed a sensible approach to analyzing factual nonconcurrence
problems under the Due Process Clauses." Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Limits on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 Mo. L. REV. 1, 59 (1993).

10. Prior to Schad, courts analyzed the problem in terms of a federal criminal defendant's right to
jury unanimity under the Sixth Amendment (see, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)). In
Schad, the Supreme Court held that "the question of juror agreement on factual issues should be interpreted under due process." Harvey, supra note 6. at 277.
11. Canino, 949 F.2d at 948 (emphasis added).
12. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, stated that
this standard is "basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society . . . and a safeguard
of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process"'. Id., at 362 (quoting Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting)).
13. 854 F.2d 638 (3rd Cir. 1988).
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appeal that the failure to give a jury instruction calling for unanimous agreement as to
which acts constituted the "continuing series" of narcotics violations was reversible
error. The Third Circuit agreed, reasoning that more than a general unanimity instruction was necessitated where the potential for jury confusion was significant. Because of
the complexity of the CCE statute, the court found enough potential for confusion here
to warrant a specific unanimity instruction.
The court relied on its reasoning in United States v. Beros,4 which in turn had
relied on the seminal case of United States v. Gipson.5 In Gipson, the Fifth Circuit
analyzed the statute before it, which prohibited a number of acts with respect to stolen
vehicles. 6 The court concluded that it could be violated by any one of several specific acts, thereby presenting a jury unanimity problem. Since the Fifth Circuit felt that a
statute prohibiting all these acts gave rise to a significant probability of jury confusion
or a less-than-unanimous verdict or both, the court concluded that
The unanimity rule ... requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just
what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged. Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected unless
this prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant's course of action is also
required. 7
Beros applied the Gipson rationale in a case implicating relatively complex criminal statutes which, like the CCE, required certain predicate acts. 8 The Third Circuit
in Beros found that, although general unanimity instructions would normally adequately safeguard a defendant's constitutional rights, "[w]hen it appears ... that there is a
genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of
different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts, the general
unanimity instruction does not suffice."' 9 Instead, a specific instruction was required
to avoid the "lack of real unanimity."2
In Echeverri, the Third Circuit found the same rationale applicable in the context
of the CCE. Noting that the jury was instructed that it must find three violations of
drug laws as an element of the CCE,2 the court stated that there was no way to determine whether the jury unanimously agreed on the same three violations. The government argued that unanimity as to such details was not required.22 The Third Circuit
replied: "We are unpersuaded. A defendant is entitled to have the court insist on unanimous agreement as to all the essential elements of the crime charged." 3 The court
14. 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987).
15. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. The statute involved was the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §
101(i)(l)(a), 62 Stat. 806 (1948 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1988)). The statute prohibits "receiving, concealing, storing, bartering, selling, or disposing of stolen vehicles moving in interstate commerce."
17. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 457-58.
18. The statutes involved were 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982) and 18 U.S.C. §664 (1982).
19. Beros, 833 F.2d at 461, quoting United States- v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir.
1983).
20. Id. at 462.
21. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643, citing United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984)
(continuing series means three drug-related criminal offenses). But see supra note 5 (circuits not in
agreement as to number of offenses required to constitute "continuing series").
22. Id.
23. Id. As discussed infra, this reasoning reveals one possible flaw with the Echeverri approach.
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further found that the complexity of the CCE precluded the effectiveness of a simple
general unanimity instruction, and that Echeverri's conviction on the CCE count could
not stand.
At least one court appears to have adopted the Echeverri rationale in the context
of a perjury case. In United States v. Holley 4, the Fifth Circuit - which also decided
Gipson - distinguished Schad and found that the defendant was entitled to a specific
unanimity instruction:
In Schad, there was a single killing of one individual, and Justice Souter, stressing
that under Arizona law first degree murder was "a single crime", concluded that
there was no more need for jury unanimity as to alternative mental states each
satisfying the mens rea element of the offense than there was for the jurors to all
agree on the precise means employed to cause death. [citation omitted] ...This
differs, however, from the situation where a single count as submitted to the jury
embraces two or more separate offenses, though each be a violation of the same
statute.25
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the high possibility of lack of jury unanimity as to at
least one statement in each count against the defendant warranted a new trial.
Echeverri has also found support in the scholarly discussion of jury unanimity.
Katherine L. Harvey26 has treated the issue in some depth and has found the
Echeverri rationale superior to that of Canino. The most compelling element, in her
opinion, is that allowing divergence on the predicate acts would disrupt the defendant's
constitutional right to due process of law. Not only is there substantial doubt as to
which acts the defendant committed under the Canino rationale but, more importantly,
there is a question as to whether the defendant's conduct even rose to the level of a
"continuing criminal enterprise." Harvey also cogently argues that requiring specific
unanimity is in keeping with the purpose of the statute, i.e., "to punish the drug lords,
not their subordinates. 27 She further contends that a specific unanimity requirement
would benefit not only criminal defendants but the government as well. The
government's benefit would inure from the fact that, when certain predicate act convictions are vacated, the defendant will not be acquitted of a CCE charge unless "the
vacated convictions represented the acts upon which the jury had relied to find a con-

As Professor Jimmy Gurule has pointed out, the Canino court finds the essential portion of the "continuing series" provision to be the number of predicate offenses. Since the Seventh Circuit discerns
that Congress, in enacting this statute, was primarily concerned with targeting large-scale drug operations, the size of such operations is more essential to a convicition than the specific predicate offenses
committed. Therefore, an agreement as to the number of offenses committed might satisfy the unanimity requirement "as to all the essential elements of the crime charged." However, Congressional intent
may also cogently be interpreted another way; this is also discussed infra.
Professor Gurule further commented on yet another difficulty surrounding this statute. In certain
cases, the evidence adduced at trial may be probative of a predicate offense not set forth in the indictment. Professor Gurule cogently argues that a defendant should not have to defend himself against
such unofficial charges, and that a conviction based on a predicate offense not stated in the indictment
should not be able to stand. Interview with Jimmy Gurule, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School, Notre Dame, IN (29 March 1994).
24. 942 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1991).
25. Id. at 927.
26. Harvey, supra note 7.
27. Id. at 314. But see supra note 24 for a discussion of the argument that the "purpose" might
also be read as simply requiring agreement as to the number of offenses committed, not specifically
what these offenses are.
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tinuing series."2
Professor Scott W. Howe29 has also studied the question and, while his main
emphasis was not on the correctness or incorrectness of Echeverri, he appears to
have accepted its standard when he concludes that
[a] factual concurrence mandate follows from the conclusion that due process
incorporates a legality ideal ....The Winship holding embodied an innocenceweighted legality ideal: A conviction must rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt
"
of all the facts necessary to establish a crime ....
B. United States v. Canino: The Seventh Circuit's Approach
In Canino,3" defendant was convicted for, inter alia, engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise. On appeal, one of his objections to his conviction was that the
District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as to the
predicate acts involved in the CCE charge. Defendant cited Echeverri in his favor. The
court did not accept his argument.
The Canino court found it especially significant that the Third Circuit did not

require specific unanimity as to the "five underlings" element of the CCE.33 In the
Seventh Circuit's view there was no sound distinction between this element and the

"continuing series" provision; the two should receive equal treatment on the question
of jury unanimity. The purposes of the CCE, in the court's opinion, would be better
served by a requirement of only general, as opposed to specific, unanimity in both
cases: "U]uror unanimity seems functionally incongruous with the purposes of the
CCE."' The Seventh Circuit opined that Congress' intent in enacting the CCE was to
focus "on the frequency of the defendant's participation in conspiratorial drug offens-

28. Id. at 314.
29. Howe, supra note 9.
30. Howe concentrated primarily on the importance of examining the evidence in each particular
case, rather than attempting to draw broad generalizations. Id. at 74. He feels that such case-by-case
analysis is mandated by the Due Process Clause, which, he explains, rests on the legality principle.
"The essence of legality is the notion that an individual should not be convicted or punished for a
crime unless she has engaged in conduct that was previously proscribed by positive law defining that
conduct as criminal." Id. at 9.
31. Id. at 81. Two other articles, written before Echeverri but nevertheless supporting an
Echeverri-like rationale, are Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States v. Gipson,
91 HARV. L. REv. 499 (1977) and Mark A. Gelowitz, Jury Unanimity on Questions of Material Fact:
When Six and Six Do Not Equal Twelve, 12 QUEEN'S L.J. 66 (1987).
32. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 1940
(1992)
33. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the "five underlings" provision. The Third Circuit case
most often cited for this proposition is United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989).
34. Canino, 949 F.2d at 948, n.7. The court here offers a hypothetical situation in which a jury
disagrees on which predicate offenses were found to exist but agrees that three existed. "If the jurors . . . were required to agree on which three predicate acts constituted the 'continuing series' the
defendant would be acquitted, despite the fact that everyone believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
he was involved in three criminal acts. This result is at odds with the purpose of the CCE which is
interested in punishing a defendant whom the jury is convinced was involved in a related series of
drug activity with relevant frequency. It is the defendant's demonstrated frequency in participating in
conspiratorial drug offenses that is the focus of the CCE offense, rather than any particularization of
the acts used to demonstrate 'continuous.' A conviction under the CCE is justified when the jury has
a unanimously agreed sense that the defendant exhibited such conspirational [sic] frequency rather than
a shared sense of what those acts may have been." Id.
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es" rather than on the particular offenses committed.3" Aside from such policy reasons, the court found fault with the analogy drawn by the Third Circuit between the
Gipson scenario and CCE cases:
[T]he statute Gipson examined is very different from the CCE ....The Fifth
Circuit felt that the substantive acts listed in [18 U.S.C. § 2313] were too disparate
in kind ... that absent a specific unanimity instruction it was unclear whether the
defendant was convicted for one class of offense or the other. This dichotomy in
18 U.S.C. § 2313 is not duplicated in the CCE ....The expansive breadth of
culpable offenses suitable for CCE treatment diminishes our need to ascertain
precisely what acts each juror finds attributable to the defendant . . ..
The Seventh Circuit thereby concluded that Canino's conviction was not unconstitutional despite the lack of a specific unanimity instruction.
At least one circuit, the Ninth, has manifested a willingness to adopt the Canino
rationale. In United States v. LeMaux, 3' the defendant was convicted in the District
Court of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. Defendant contended, inter alia,
that the jury should have received an instruction mandating specific unanimity as to the
predicate acts. The Ninth Circuit conceded that this would have been "the better practice,"38 but that, where the evidence was as "straightforward, generally consistent, and
powerfully incriminating ' 39 as the court found it to be in this case, there was no reason to question the jury's determinations.
In a pre-Canino law review article, 4' attorney Hayden J. Trubitt supported the
propriety, in some instances, of what he termed "patchwork verdicts." Trubitt based his
conclusions largely on the notion of the "rule of individualism"'" and the "slippery
slope" danger of applying the Gipson rationale to diverse situations. Trubitt essentially
concludes that patchwork verdicts are frequently acceptable and that, contrary to the
suggestion
of Gipson, a defendant is not unconditionally entitled to specific unanimi2
ty.

4

Trubitt's reasoning, however, does not necessarily require that juries in CCE
cases receive instructions of only general unanimity. For one, Trubitt himself states
that "patchwork verdicts should be least acceptable in capital cases and increasingly
acceptable in felony, misdemeanor, and civil cases. '43 Violation of the CCE is a serious enough felony to warrant a minimum mandatory sentence of twenty years' imprisonment; some defendants receive life in prison or the death penalty. Under Trubitt's
own reasoning, therefore, CCE cases are among those in which patchwork verdicts are
least tolerable.
Secondly, Trubitt's article focused on statutes which differ significantly from the

35. Harvey, supra note 7 at 287. See also supra notes 23 and 34.
36. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946.
37. 994 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 689. The court cites to United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1573 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied 497 U.S. 1003 (1990).
39. Id.
40. Trubitt, supra note 4.
41. This "rule" can be succinctly summarized as requiring "that each juror should give his verdict
as if he were the sole judge of the case. The rule of individualism suggests that patchwork verdicts
are proper." Trubitt, supra note 4 at 559.
42. Id. at 558.
43. Id. at 532.
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CCE. As previously mentioned, the CCE arguably is more concerned with the size and
scope of an operation than with the specific predicate offenses which might bring a
defendant within the purview of the statute. Trubitt's choice of words, however, suggested that he had studied statutes, like the one at issue in Gipson, where potential
predicate offenses were actually listed therein. Trubitt himself opined that Gipson
"provides no useful guidance for interpreting other statutes;"' hence, his arguments
4
against the Gipson approach might not readily apply to cases involving the CCE
Furthermore, Professor Howe has cogently explained why "slippery slope" arguments like Trubitt's do not withstand protracted analyses.' In essence, he argues that
if there is no "distorted risk of misinterpretaion that would run in favor of criminally
accused persons",4 there is no slippery slope of which to complain. And because
Howe believes that CCE cases warrant thorough case-by-case- analyses, he opines that
one decision will not - or at least, should not - "do much to inform future
decisionmakers of how to resolve nonconcurrence problems not specifically addressed."48 Thus, Trubitt's fear that "hard cases will require unanimity on deeper and
deeper levels of specificity," 49 and that "[t]he resulting precedents would be embarrassing at best and dangerous at worst,""0 is not likely to materialize in the context of
CCE cases.
III. THE NECESSARY STATUTORY REVISIONS
The arguments advanced in favor of the Canino approach do not completely lack
merit. The Seventh Circuit's reading of Congressional intent is certainly plausible, and
if Congress did seek to target certain operations based on their size as opposed to the
specific activities in which they engaged, it can be asserted that a general unanimity
instruction in a CCE case is sufficient. Moreover, the Third Circuit's disparate treatment of the "five underlings" and "continuing series" provisions is questionable. The
Third Circuit in Jackson reasoned that "[u]nlike the three offenses necessary to constitute a series, which is the conduct which the CCE statute is designed to punish and
deter, the identity of these underlings is peripheral to the statute's other primary concern, which is the defendant's exercise of the requisite degree of supervisory authority
over a sizeable enterprise."'" The Canino court found the two provisions essentially
indistinguishable; arguably, the Third Circuit has not presented a fully persuasive view
to the contrary.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the arguments for general unanimity fail to
comport with the constitutional right of a federal criminal defendant to a unanimous
jury verdict. "Our criminal justice system has always required more than mere jury
agreement that a defendant is an evildoer to convict him,"52 and whether we prefer to

44. Id. at 549.
45. Opining that "a patchwork verdict is not unconstitutional if it is between distinct acts," Trubitt
admonishes courts to avoid following Gipson's suggestion to the contrary. Id. at 558.
46. Howe, supra note 9.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 25. Interested readers should refer to Professor Howe's article in its entirety. It is discussed only briefly here, but Howe himself sets forth a rich and complete discussion of this and other
issues relevant to the subject of this article.
49. Trubitt, supra note 4 at 549.
50. Id.
51. United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1989).
52. Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States v. Gipson, 91 HARV. L. REV.
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classify this problem as the right to a unanimous jury or the right to due process, the
right is constitutional in nature and reasonable doubts as to any facts relevant to a
conviction should be dispelled. "Mere agreement as to some vague idea of guilt is not
sufficient to render a lawful verdict."53 Moreover, while the Canino court read the
purpose behind the statute as aimed at size rather than substance, other interpretations
are both possible and plausible. "The CCE statute's primary purpose is to punish the
drug lords, not their subordinates. Allowing significant juror divergence on the predicate acts constituting the statute's 'continuing series' element would disrupt that very
purpose and intrude on the CCE defendant's constitutional right to due process of
law."'
Different proposals have surfaced to aid in protecting a defendant's rights in
these circumstances. One commentator, deeming such rights "Gipson rights," has suggested that the trial court could be delegated the duty to instruct the jury, at counsel's
request, that they must be unanimous as to every component of the relevant act(s). The
commentator recognized, however, that since this provided the means "least intrusive
on traditional jury prerogatives," 5 it would also tend to be least effective. The commentator also, therefore, examined a remedy "at the other end of the spectrum of intrusiveness": special verdicts and special interrogatories.56 Although these are generally
disfavored in criminal trials, they are not impossibilities. The commentator's findings
with respect to special verdicts are bolstered by Katherine Harvey's article.57 Until
and unless courts receive a directive from Congress or the Supreme Court, this remains
a possibility that should not be ignored.
However, the optimal solution at this juncture would be an amendment to the
statute. Congress must clarify whether it intended results along the lines of Canino or
Echeverri. This article has argued, with the support of other commentators, that the
constitutional requirement of juror unanimity is fully met and best protected only by
the specific unanimity which the Echeverri court mandated. Congress must inform us
if it agrees - and even if it does not - in order that all similarly-situated defendants
might be tried in a similar manner. Section 848 (c)(2) of Title 21 should be amended
to include a sentence such as: "The jury shall be unanimous as to the specific acts
constituting the 'continuing series of violations' referred to above. 58
In the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, such a specific revision is necessary to insure that courts will continue to respect the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty

499, 501 (1977).
53. Mark A. Gelowitz, Jury Unanimity on Questions of Material Fact: When Six and Six Do Not
Equal Twelve, 12 QUEEN'S L.J. 66, 100 (1987).
54. Harvey, supra note 7 at 314.
55. Note, supra note 52 at 503.
56. Id.
57. Id. See also Harvey, supra note 7 at 311-14.
58. Congress might also want to clarify the number of jurors who must agree to make a verdict
"unanimous"; whether such unanimity is also required for the "five underlings" provision of the statute;
and how many offenses it intends to comprise a "continuing series." The latter two issues have been
discussed briefly in the footnotes to this article; as mentioned, the circuits are split as to these questions as well. Harvey, among other commentators, discusses the "number of jurors" problem. See supra
note 6 at 296-98.
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'
man go free."59
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